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The Cinematic Bergson 
From Virtual Image to Actual Gesture 
John Ó Maoilearca 
Kingston University, London 
According to Gilles Deleuze “cinema is Bergsonian.”1  Despite the fact that 
Henri Bergson critiques the cinematographic mechanism in his magnum 
opus Creative Evolution2 (on account of its movement being one applied to still 
images rather than being immanent to them), Deleuze correctly realized 
how central the moving image nonetheless was to Bergson’s philosophy. Yet 
this was already clear in Bergson’s own testimonies: “When I first saw the 
cinematograph I realized it could offer something new to philosophy. 
Indeed we could almost say that cinema is a model of consciousness itself. 
Going to the cinema turns out to be a philosophical experience.”3 If 
Bergson’s relationship with the cinematic apparatus is ambivalent, (being a 
model of consciousness, but only in how it distorts the real), it remains to be 
seen in what manner his affirmative stance towards film should be 
understood.  In his positive account, Deleuze emphasizes the virtual image 
from Bergson’s earlier work, Matter and Memory, in order to show how 
movement is indeed immanent to the image, but only in virtue of its 
incorporeality. Such “virtualism” has been criticized elsewhere for its 
unBergsonian tenets.4 In what follows we will show how the cinematic body 
offers another way of rendering cinema Bergsonian. This more actualist 
Bergsonism is not pursued in order to be more faithful to Bergson, however, 
but to show how his ideas dovetail with modern corporeal, gestural 
readings of the film image.  When Dominique Chateau writes in Cinéma et 
philosophie that Bergson was the first major philosopher to take cinema as a 
model for philosophy, this is not only a historical thesis: his ideas remain 
pertinent to a range of contemporary approaches in film theory and place 
further weight on role of the body, not only for the experience of the 
spectator but also in the very nature of the moving image.5 
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Something Infinitely Simple 
Amongst Jean Renoir’s various maxims concerning the creative process, 
probably the most renowned touches on a lack at the heart of such creativity: 
“But, you know, everyone really only makes one film in his life, and then 
breaks it up into fragments and makes it again.”6 Yet such repetition within 
creation need not lead us to doubt the possibility of novelty. This becomes 
clear when we look at another, cognate observation from Renoir’s fellow 
Frenchman, Henri Bergson, only this time regarding philosophy. Discussing 
the “single point” that each philosopher makes throughout his or her whole 
career, he writes: 
In this point is something simple, infinitely simple, so 
extraordinarily simple that the philosopher has never succeeded in 
saying it. And that is why he went on talking all his life. He could 
not formulate what he had in mind without feeling himself obliged 
to correct his formula, then to correct his correction: thus, from 
theory to theory, correcting when he thought he was completing, 
what he has accomplished, by a complication which provoked 
more complication, by developments heaped upon developments, 
has been to convey with an increasing approximation the simplicity 
of his original intuition. All the complexity of his doctrine, which 
would go on ad infinitum, is therefore only the incommensurability 
between his simple intuition and the means at his disposal for 
expressing it. What is this intuition?7 
Coming from Bergson’s essay, “Philosophical Intuition,”  the first answer to 
his question—what is intuition?—will arrive in the form of the philosophical 
“image,” a “mediating” image that is “almost matter in that it still allows 
itself to be seen, and almost mind in that it no longer allows itself to be 
touched.”8 Yet it is not, he assures us, to be confused with the virtual images 
discussed in his earlier work Matter and Memory, but something far more 
actual, more embodied (and yet still not a spatial, fixed, body): It is, Bergson 
writes, 
A receding and vanishing image, which haunts, unperceived 
perhaps, the mind of the philosopher, which follows him like his 
shadow through the ins and outs of his thought and which, if it is 
not the intuition itself, approaches it much more closely than the 
conceptual expression, of necessity symbolical, to which the 
intuition must have recourse in order to furnish “explanation.” Let 
us look closely at this shadow: by doing so we shall divine the 
attitude of the body which projects it. And if we try to imitate this 
attitude, or better still to assume it ourselves, we shall see as far as 
it is possible what the philosopher saw.9 
Deleuze, we know, made much of the virtual images of Matter and Memory 
in his two Cinema books, transforming a psycho-meta-physical thesis into an 
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ontological one (thereby disregarding Bergson’s own anti-ontological stance) 
while also distorting Bergson’s negative view of the cinematic apparatus (in 
Creative Evolution) into a positive view of cinema editing. In this essay, we 
will instead be pursuing this “attitude of the body” that projects the 
vanishing but singular image of philosophical intuition. And we will do so 
through an analogy with the idea of “one” (image or idea) that underpins a 
film. This will be an attempt, therefore, to generate or project a film of 
intuition—to assume (or suggest) the (film) image of (philosophical) 
intuition (rather than simply one more philosophy of film).10 After all, even 
in Matter and Memory, the image is described ardently as something that is 
not a picture (“to picture is not to remember”), and the brain is portrayed as 
an organ of mime. The brain does not represent (an idea, or a picture); 
rather, it performs its images through its own equivalent of an actor’s 
“gestures and attitudes.”11 It is this performed, bodily cinema that we will 
examine, both through what Bergson has to say about gesture, and through 
a gestural concept enacted by a film, to be precise, Lars von Trier’s The Five 
Obstructions (2003).12  
This will also bring us back to the idea of what it is that is being 
remade, both by directors and philosophers, in Renoir’s “one film” and 
Bergson’s singular “vanishing image.”  The Five Obstructions is comprised of 
five remakes of an original work by another film-maker, Jørgen Leth. Leth, a 
mentor of von Trier, is instructed by von Trier to remake five sequences 
from his own 1967 short film, The Perfect Human (a pseudo-anthropological 
study of human behaviour). Each remake comes with an obstruction or 
“creative constraint.” The constraints are as follows: 1. that it be remade with 
no shot longer than 12 frames; 2. that it be remade in the most miserable 
place on earth; 3. that it be remade with no constraint at all (a form of meta-
obstruction of total freedom); 4. that it be remade as a cartoon (the definition 
of a non-film for both von Trier and Leth); and finally, 5. that von Trier 
makes the fifth remake, though it must be both credited to and narrated by 
Leth.  
As such, one way of reading The Five Obstructions is precisely as an 
enactment of Renoir’s adage—that each film-maker only makes one film, 
again and again—with von Trier forcing Leth to recompose The Perfect 
Human repeatedly following certain constraints. Such forms of 
experimentation in film are not unique, however. In 1998 Gus Van Sant 
directed a shot-by-shot remake of Alfred Hitchcock’s 1960 classic horror 
film, Psycho. While the new film was in colour, rather than the original’s 
black and white, and was set in a contemporary era with a new cast, it 
otherwise retained nearly all of the first film’s audio-visual structure—
including Bernard Hermann’s score.13 Indeed, such was its fidelity to the 
1960 film that some critics dubbed it a (rather pointless) “duplicate” rather 
than a remake.14 A duplicate like this, presumably, would lie somewhere 
between a mere re-mastered print of the original and a true remake. But if a 
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remake is to be more than a duplicate, then what exactly is being remade (if 
it is not an audio-visual structure)? In answer to why Van Sant’s audio-
visual replica of the structure of Psycho was deemed such a failure we will 
propose that the sheer repetition of such structures is never invention. 
Rather, what is remade—but with novelty—is never a fixed image or sound, a 
propositional state or story. And this is the (Bergsonian) conjecture we will 
pursue: that what is remade (by philosopher or director) is not a picture but 
a posture—a bodily stance or “attitude.” It is this gestural recreation that 
allows novelty and repetition to coexist.  
 
Bergsonian Re-orientations 
One basis for Bergson’s re-orientation (from picturing to posturing) in Matter 
and Memory and beyond can be gleaned from the description of intuition 
offered in his 1903 essay, “Introduction to Metaphysics.” Here, Bergson 
outlines the famous contrast between creative intuition and the “ready-
made” concepts of “analysis”: “To try a concept on an object is to ask of the 
object what we have to do with it, what it can do for us. To label an object 
with a concept is to tell in precise terms the kind of action or attitude the 
object is to suggest to us.”15 Bergson’s corporealist stance is already 
indicated in this use of terms such as “attitude” and it is ability to “suggest”: 
attitudine, “fitness, posture;” and suggerere, “bring from below,” from 
“gesture” or gerere, to “bear, wield, perform.” And both are linked to 
Bergson’s most renowned formulation of intuition that comes in the same 
essay: thinking in duration means “to reverse the normal direction of the 
workings of thought.”16 Few philosophers have argued anything so heretical 
as we find in Bergson’s approach to metaphysics, that is, a radical reversal of 
what we think metaphysics (and philosophy) to be and how we think it 
operates (in an “anti-Kantian” metaphysics of immanence, as Quentin 
Meillassoux describes Bergson’s method).17 More than this, it leads us to a 
redirection of where thinking is supposed to take place: thinking changes 
source and direction, passing from things to concepts, and not from concepts to 
things. Bergson’s idea is not that we merely change the direction of our 
thought about things (whatever that might mean), but that metaphysical 
thinking somehow starts with the object too, at least as an orientation, posture, 
or attitude.  This is his call to re-orient or reverse our stance: the inversion of 
the work of the mind is not intellectualist, but behavioural in attitude. 
At an even more most abstract level, this postural aspect of Bergson’s 
thought engages with the theory of images in Matter and Memory. Let us 
recall the basics of the imagology in its first chapter where what we perceive 
is only what interests us (and our bodies) at any moment:  
To the degree that my horizon widens, the images which surround 
me seem to be painted upon a more uniform background and 
become to me more indifferent. The more I narrow this horizon, the 
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more the objects which it circumscribes space themselves out 
distinctly according to the greater or lesser ease with which my 
body can touch and move them. They send back [renvoient, 
“return”], then, to my body, as would a mirror, its eventual 
influence; they take rank in an order corresponding to the growing 
or decreasing powers of my body. The objects which surround my 
body reflect its possible action upon them.18 
There is a “background” that re-turns to my body only what interests it, so 
that even “distance” itself takes on an axiological form, representing “above 
all, the measure in which surrounding bodies are insured, in some way, 
against the immediate action of my body.”19 My body is simply “an object”, 
but one capable of performing a “new action” upon surrounding objects, 
and this ability to act anew is what marks out its “privileged position” in 
regard to other, background objects. Hence, to undo what the body 
instigates, to reverse this “narrow” attitude, is to look again in detail (in 
higher-definition) and in close-up at this background: it requires a reversal 
of orientation.  
Indeed, in Matter and Memory even memory, apparently the most 
virtual element of Bergson’s thought, is tied to bodily stance: 
Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some 
period of our history, we become conscious of an act sui generis by 
which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace 
ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain region of the 
past—a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a 
camera. But our recollection still remains virtual; we simply 
prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the appropriate attitude.20 
If this seems to go too far—especially given Bergson’s purportedly 
disembodied “spiritualist” tendencies—then the following description of 
education from the introduction to The Creative Mind may help to confirm 
this revision of his work. Here he argues that, to understand a text, a student  
Must fall into step with him [the author] by adopting his gestures, 
his attitudes, his gait, by which I mean learning to read the text 
aloud with the proper intonation and inflection. The intelligence 
will later add shades of meaning. Before intellection properly so-
called, there is the perception of structure and movement; there is, 
on the page one reads, punctuation and rhythm. Now it is in 
indicating this structure and rhythm, in taking into consideration 
the temporal relations between the various sentences of the 
paragraph and the various parts of each sentence, in following 
uninterruptedly the crescendo of thought and feeling to the point 
musically indicated as the culminating point that the art of diction 
consists.  […] One knows, one understands only what one can in 
some measure reinvent.21 
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Reinvention is not the repetition of fixed structures but “structure and 
rhythm”—movement or gesture. In the footnote that follows this passage, 
Bergson goes even further in this gestural comprehension of comprehension, 
arguing that “rhythm roughly outlines the meaning of the sentence truly 
written, that it can give us direct communication with the writer’s thought 
before study of the words has given them color and shading.”22 In one 
lecture at the Collège de France on Descartes’ Discours de la Méthode, he tells 
us that he took some pages of the text as an example “to show how the 
comings and goings of thought, each in a particular direction, pass from the 
mind of Descartes to our own solely by the effect of the rhythm as indicated 
by the punctuation, and especially as brought out by reading it aloud 
correctly.”23 This footnote then refers the reader to Bergson’s 1912 lecture 
“The Soul and the Body” where thinking is vectorised in a clearly 
behaviourist manner, albeit also being internalised as a tendency, “nascent” 
and “performed in the brain”: 
Consider thinking itself; you will find directions rather than states, 
and you will see that thinking is essentially a continual and 
continuous change of inward direction, incessantly tending to 
translate itself by changes of outward direction, I mean by actions 
and gestures capable of outlining in space and of expressing 
metaphorically, as it were, the comings and goings of the mind. Of 
these movements, sketched out or even simply prepared, we are 
most often unaware, because we have no interest in knowing them; 
but we have to notice them when we try to seize hold of our 
thought in order to grasp it all living and make it pass, still living, 
into the soul of another. The words may then have been well 
chosen, but they will not convey the whole of what we wish to 
make them say if we do not succeed by the rhythm, by the 
punctuation, by the relative lengths of the sentences and part of the 
sentences, by a particular dancing of the sentence, in making the 
reader’s mind, continually guided by a series of nascent 
movements, describe a curve of thought and feeling analogous to 
that we ourselves described. […] The rhythm speech has here, then, 
no other object than that of choosing the rhythm of the thought: 
and what can the rhythm of the thought be but the rhythm of the 
scarcely conscious nascent movements which accompany it? These 
movements, by which thought continually tends to externalize 
itself in actions, are clearly prepared and, as it were, performed in 
the brain.24 
Here we have a kind of micro-behaviourism of the brain as well as the 
macro-behaviourism of bodies in relation—one that would short-cut the 
traditional disputes between “central state” materialists and logical 
behaviourists by rendering behaviour neurological while also upgrading 
cerebral motor-mechanisms to something more than just mechanical 
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movements. If the brain does “control” behaviour, it is because it too is 
behaviour. 
 
Gestural Cinema   
Of course, explicitly behavioural analyses in cinema theory are not unusual 
either, though few can be as radical as that of Giorgio Agamben, for whom it 
is gesture, rather than the image, which is the fundamental filmic property. 
His short essay, “The Six Most Beautiful Minutes in the History of Cinema”, 
for example, discusses a sequence from Orson Welles’s unfinished Don 
Quixote in terms of gesture:  
Sancho Panza enters a cinema in a provincial city. He is looking for 
Don Quixote and finds him sitting off to the side, staring at the 
screen. The theater is almost full; the balcony - which is a sort of 
giant terrace - is packed with raucous children. After several 
unsuccessful attempts to reach Don Quixote, Sancho reluctantly sits 
down in one of the lower seats, next to a little girl (Dulcinea?), who 
offers him a lollipop. The screening has begun; it is a costume film: 
on the screen, knights in armor are riding along. Suddenly, a 
woman appears; she is in danger. Don Quixote abruptly rises, 
unsheaths his sword, rushes toward the screen, and, with several 
lunges, begins to shred the cloth. The woman and the knights are 
still visible on the screen, but the black slash opened by Don 
Quixote’s sword grows ever larger, implacably devouring the 
images. In the end, nothing is left of the screen, and only the 
wooden structure supporting it remains visible.25 
Quixote’s gesture destroys the cinema image, and, likewise, Agamben 
claims that gesture is the quintessential cinematic element, replacing the 
photograph as its fundamental unit: 
The mythical rigidity of the image has been broken and that here, 
properly speaking, there are no images but only gestures. Every 
image, in fact, is animated by an antinomic polarity: on the one 
hand, images are the reification and obliteration of a gesture (it is 
the imago as death mask or as symbol); on the other hand, they 
preserve the dynamis intact.26 
Agamben’s analyses of cinema indicate a nostalgia for “the homeland of 
gesture.”27 But they are also a political and ethical call for a future cinema 
that reconfigures the relationship between image and gesture. For him, the 
moving image as gesture has the power to liberate the cinematic from the 
last traces of a static image. 
Despite his focus upon gesture, we will not follow Agamben any 
further here even if, in one respect, we stay true to his line (which itself 
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follows Foucault) that what we call “gesture” is only “what remains 
unexpressed in each expressive act” and “the exhibition of a mediality: it is the 
process of making a means visible as such.”28 Indeed, one of Bergson’s most 
notorious demands for philosophy is that it should seek a means to know 
the Real without any “expression, translation or symbolic representation.”29 
And for Bergson, intuitive “metaphysics is that means. Metaphysics, therefore, 
is the science which claims to dispense with symbols.”30 And yet we know that 
when Bergson describes a metaphysics that would dispense with symbols, it 
is really a question of what type of symbolism is at stake, fluid or fixed, 
suggestive or direct, bespoke or ready-made, and not the symbolic tout court. 
A philosophy-without-symbols is really a philosophy-without-standard-
symbols, therefore, and is practiced without fixed representations (be they 
linguistic, conceptual, or photographic). It begins, he says, with images that 
gesture toward (suggest) an intuition. Images direct us towards intuitions, 
they do not stand for (represent) intuitions. 
 
Unconstrained Style:  
Behaviourism in The Five Obstructions 
Earlier, I described Von Trier’s The Five Obstructions as a work whose very 
form explores a number of issues concerning aesthetic creativity and 
generative constraint. The third of the five constraints was also a meta-level 
one, involving no constraint at all—complete artistic freedom. For a film-
maker in the realist tradition like Leth, however, this was a definite 
imposition. The perversity arises because Leth initially asks for an 
alternative constraint whereby von Tier would provide a new set of 
obstructions for him to endure: as he says, “I prefer you to make the 
decisions.” Yet, precisely because that would be Leth’s preference, von Trier 
decrees that it is Leth who must make all the decisions in absolute freedom for 
this third remake. So, why is such total freedom an imposition for Leth 
(beyond the usual psychoanalytic/existential responses concerning the 
intolerable burden of personal responsibility)? It is simply because von Trier 
shares with Leth the idea that constraints are crucial for creativity in film-
making, such that imposing a free-style film on his former teacher can only 
be—as Mette Hjort puts it—“a straightforward negation of Leth’s 
characteristic approach.”31  
We must note here that Leth’s model of optical film-realism involves 
patience, that is, a certain kind of passivity: “I normally find places and then 
isolate something I want to examine. That’s the method. And then I frame it 
very precisely and wait for the right moment. I believe very strongly in 
waiting and observing.”32 Leth allows the moment to be captured to present 
itself—to let the randomness of the Real take its course. Admittedly, it is he 
who selects the “decisive moment” to record (to borrow one of Cartier-
Bresson’s terms), but its emergence is spontaneous. Let us say that it belongs 
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to the Real (or Real Time, as Bergson would call it). Ordering Leth to make 
any film he wishes in the third obstruction is actually an imposition of sorts: 
less the burden of responsibility than the burden of creativity. Leth’s natural 
preference is to let the Real offer up the “concrete instants” that he will 
passively record, rather than that he conduct all affairs. Forcing all of the 
decision-making process onto Leth actually removes his artistic freedom, 
oddly enough.  Naturally, Leth is free to escape from his freedom, in this 
third film at least, by reverting to his usual long-take realist aesthetic. And 
yet, this is not what he does. Instead, he offers up a highly stylised, rather 
formal piece, using split screens, cryptic monologues, and quite clichéd “art-
house” imagery (a mysterious man and woman, sexual encounters in 
expensive hotel rooms, a sense of political or criminal intrigue, slow-moving 
limousines, clandestine meetings in rainy, desolate locations, and so on).  
Earlier, I alluded to the pseudo-anthropological approach in The 
Perfect Human in its original form. The narration of the third remake (in 
English), compounds this impression even further: 
Here’s the man. Here he is. What’s he want?  
Here’s the woman. Here she is. What does she want?  
Here’s a man. We don’t know him. I don’t know what to say about him. 
We love that he is special, unreasonable. A distant look, a loss of soul, a 
distant look.  
I would like to know something more about him. I can see that he is here, 
and that he works. I have seen him smoke a cigarette. I didn’t see him 
write. Is he good at describing death? Does he think about fucking? He is 
alone, preparing himself. He goes out and takes care of things. He’s the 
perfect man. 
In this and other sequences the question as to what the man is thinking is 
reiterated, but never answered. All we are given are external details, visuals 
of movement—of smoking, of shaving, of waiting. Alongside this 
unanswered enquiry comes the peculiar mannerism of this version, with a 
certain “type” of art-house cinema being replicated throughout. Paramount 
in this, however, is the acting role of the male protagonist. Leth casts Patrick 
Bauchau to play “the man” (Claus Nissen’s role in the original) almost 
entirely because of his presence and style. Murray Smith remarks on this as 
follows: 
The casting of Patrick Bauchau in #3: Brussels, for example, [was] 
inspired by Leth’s admiration for his performance as the 
protagonist of Eric Rohmer’s La collectionneuse. Intriguingly, 
Rohmer’s film was, like The Perfect Human, released in 1967; it as if 
Leth has chosen a better-known counterpart to Claus Nissen— an 
equally handsome actor from the same generation, both born in 
1938—in order to stress the effects of time and experience on the 
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model-like “perfection” of the figures in his original film (Leth 
notes the importance of Bauchau’s “well-bruised” quality to his 
casting in #3: Brussels).33 
Nonetheless, it is not as if Bauchau is given much to do by Leth in this film, 
for he mostly poses in rooms, has little dialogue and even less interaction 
with other actors. He is there because of his “look.” Leth is obviously 
delighted with his casting, stating that he is “…really pleased with him. He 
looks great. […] He is well […] well bruised as a person. He has experience 
of life. He has lived a life. His story is fantastic.”34 Bauchau, then, stands for 
a certain type and remakes the Claus Nissen protagonist through a 
distinctive acting style, almost bordering on non-acting: he is a man who 
“takes care of things” just by looking like such a man. Indeed, of all six films, 
the original and the third versions of The Perfect Human place the most 
emphasis on acting style (as opposed to editing in One, location in Two, 
animation in Four, and performativity in Five).35 And it is Murray Smith, 
once more, who finds the right idea on this front when describing the 
original The Perfect Human:  
The Perfect Human is an enigmatic, spare narrative film, depicting a 
man and a woman engaged in various generic activities—eating, 
dancing, undressing, shaving—mostly in isolation from one 
another. […] The setting of the film is abstract in the extreme: the 
performers are afforded certain minimal props (a razor, a bed, a 
dining table) but the space behind them is so overexposed as to 
lead the eye into a white void. The man and the woman are 
beautiful, young, chic; much of the time they are doing little more 
than striking poses in the featureless zone that they occupy.36 
It is possible to read The Five Obstructions as a reflection on difference and 
repetition in film-making, with von Trier forcing Leth to recompose The 
Perfect Human repeatedly following certain constraints. But the obstructions 
to each remake nonetheless ensure a creative reproduction, rather than a 
faithful replica. This has been accounted for partly through the use of 
constant stylistic innovation. As von Trier writes of his own work: “You can 
become so good at producing things that they become nauseatingly boring 
to look at. That might have happened had I continued to make the same film 
again and again, as some people do.”37 Von Trier is known for not repeating 
himself, at least stylistically—switching genres and aesthetics (realism, magic 
realism, documentary, theatricality, abstraction) at every opportunity. Yet, 
von Trier insists on a partial repetition in each task given to Leth, albeit that 
the added obstructions guarantee a certain creativity in style. Mette Hjort 
comments on this, saying that “the commitment [to renewing styles] 
throughout, it transpires, is to a form of self-provocation that involves 
abandoning the cinematic techniques as they are mastered in favour of new 
challenges.”38 Hence, we should interpret the qualification above, “at least 
stylistically”, in such a way that the issue of style becomes a highly 
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significant approach.  As Smith also writes, “In The Five Obstructions the 
game of style is narrativised; the variations in style have an overt motivation 
in the narrative contest recounted by the film. Even so, the variations are not 
motivated in the traditional manner as apt stylistic expressions of theme.”39 
In the opening obstruction, set in Cuba, a certain behavioural attitude is also 
assumed. Adopting the same pseudo-anthropological pose as its original, 
this The Perfect Human also asks questions such as “What is the perfect 
human thinking? Is he thinking about happiness? Death? Love?” And yet 
the answers eventually provided to these and other questions often appear 
to be pseudo-answers, at least for those who are looking for sufficient 
reasons. Paisley Livingston describes the situation thus: 
The response to the question: “Why does he move this way?” is a 
comical flaunting of Trier’s injunction to answer the questions 
raised by the narrator of The Perfect Human; the proposed answer 
(“Because women like it”) does not really answer the question, 
while seeming to do so in a blunt way; all the other questions 
remain willfully unanswered in the remake, which reinforces the 
thought that Leth has cleverly slipped past this obstruction.40 
However, I would want respond to Livingston that questions such as “what 
is he thinking?” or those concerning the character’s motivations are indeed 
answered, only through external behaviour or style of movement. The film 
takes an externalist approach to questions of putatively inner motivation. It 
is a filmic behavourism. Hjort adds to this point about acting and style by 
referring to Arthur Danto’s claim, in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 
that “style is a gift” (it cannot be directed), and expresses individual “‘ways 
of seeing the world.’”41 Danto himself goes even further, arguing that “style 
is the man.” When someone paints in the style of Rembrandt, for example, 
“he has adopted a manner, and to at least that degree he is not immanent in 
the painting in the way Rembrandt is.”42 All the same,  
The language of immanence is made licit by the identity of the man 
himself and his style—he is his style—and by transitivity of 
identity Rembrandt is his paintings considered in the perspective of 
style. […] What, really, is “the man himself”? I have argued a 
theory to the effect that we are systems of representations, ways of 
seeing the world, representations incarnate.43 
In Leth’s films of The Perfect Human, consequently, we could say that it is the 
human—who may be an actor or the director in the strict sense, but always a 
performer in the broad sense—who is these “representations incarnate”, this 
way of seeing. And it is also a way of answering, a way of reasoning without 
identifiably philosophical forms of rationality. One might say that they are 
behavioural and cinematic explanations.  
All in all, then, be it through this externalization of ideas, the 
behaviourist and anthropological approach adopted, or the role of the 
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actor/director as a type of performer, this third version of The Perfect Human 
partly enacts the question of just what a remake, replica, or repetition is on a 
number of different levels. For the most peculiar thing is that, having been 
given the utmost freedom to make this version, Leth’s third film is probably 
the least like the original when compared to the others.  
 
Crux Scenica, Or Remaking the Gesture Cinematically 
In conclusion, we should say a little more about acting and Bergson’s most 
sustained engagement with theatrical performance and gesture—in his 
work, Le Rire, on laughter and the meaning of the comical. Previously, we 
noted that the actor playing the perfect human for the third remake in The 
Five Obstructions, Patrick Bauchau, was cast in part for his “well-bruised” 
quality. He performs the “Man in Brussels” in a set of poses mute, his world-
weary face doing a good deal of the acting for him. It is notable that early 
cinema acting, following its theatrical forebear, was hugely influenced by 
the tradition of mime and gesture, with both heroic and comical postures in 
acting characterised as deviations from the relaxed, erect, symmetrical pose, 
or ‘crux scenica’. David Mayer explains this in more detail as follows: 
To convey such an individual, the actor’s stance is the prescribed 
crux scenica: the relaxed body upright, arms similarly relaxed to 
gesture easily, knees slightly flexed, heels together, toes apart at a 
ninety-degree angle. This posture, which coincides with the 
development of ballet positions, we recognize as First Position. In 
any departure from a posture in which the body is always in 
control, denying or subduing all unruly and anti-social impulses, 
the actor begins to define character. Should the actor assume 
another stance, the audience, reading these signs, may make 
inferences about the character depicted. The crux scenica identified 
the man or woman of intellect and self-discipline. Self-control—a 
few key gestures and a virtual absence of multiple histrionic 
gestures—allowed an admirable person to survive intrigues 
without needing to reach for his sword or break her fan.44  
In the 1830s, the Parisian elocutionist François Delsarte codified a “gestural 
vocabulary” for the stage. Delsarte kept to this early eighteenth-century 
notion that any stance that deviated from the crux scenica could be read as a 
sign of (bad) character. This gestural acting, while not realistic by present-
day standards, was nonetheless regarded at the time as verisimilar 
performance. Crucially, because absolute reality was deemed unknowable, 
acting Truth was more highly valued than a putative acting realism. As James 
Naremore relates, this is what theatre historians “now call the mimetic or 
“pantomime” tradition—a performance technique that relies on 
conventionalized poses to help the actor indicate “fear,” “sorrow,” “hope,” 
J o h n  Ó  M a o i l e a r c a  |  2 1 5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.777 
“confusion,” and so forth.” This was opposed to the position of 
“psychological realism” found in naturalism and later Method acting.45  
Jean-Claude Schmitt has written about how the concept of attitude 
(modus habendi) is closely associated with that of figuratio. It results from the 
pausing of the movement that forms an ideal figure.46 Similarly, Elisabeth 
Engberg-Pedersen tells us that “differences in body posture link with 
emotionally different facial expressions to signal sequences of discourse 
with shifted attribution of expressive elements.”47 In many respects, then, 
from what we have already seen, Bergson also belongs to this tradition of 
physicalised attitude, only now displaced onto philosophy. When writing on 
attention, he showed how “stage by stage we shall be led on to define 
attention as an adaptation of the body rather than of the mind and to see in 
this attitude of consciousness mainly the consciousness of an attitude.”48 It is 
even arguable that this rich behaviourism of Bergson renders the problem of 
propositional attitudes (of beliefs) bodily, a matter of physical posture 
(attitudine). For as we saw, thinking itself is equally vectorised in a clearly 
behaviourist manner, albeit also being internalised as a tendency, 
“performed in the brain.” Here we have the aforementioned micro-
behaviours of the brain alongside a macro-behaviours of bodies. Any causal 
reduction (of brain by world or vice versa) would not be entailed, for the 
macro-posture would simply be the “externalised” translation of many 
micro-postures, none of which are determining because each domain is 
equally real.  
Deviations from the crux scenica, we were told, often bore the physical 
weight of comedy—the clownish, animal distortions of the perfectly human 
posture—erect and in control. The comical both imitates and distorts what is 
deemed the norm. In the kinds of cinematic aping that we see in The Five 
Obstructions, each remake repeats and distorts the original (sometimes with 
comical results). As Paisley Livingstone noted, some of the remakes not only 
mimic their original (Leth’s The Perfect Human), but also create “a comical 
flaunting of Trier’s injunction”—cocking a snook at von Trier’s own 
attempts to “control” Leth’s artistic work.  Such gestural derision also 
resonates with Bergson’s theory of comedy in Le Rire. Here, he points to the 
comic potential in the connection between gesture and repetition: 
In a public speaker, for instance, we find that gesture vies with 
speech. Jealous of the latter, gesture closely dogs the speaker’s 
thought, demanding also to act as interpreter. […] But I find that a 
certain movement of head or arm, a movement always the same, 
seems to return at regular intervals. If I notice it and it succeeds in 
diverting my attention, if I wait for it to occur and it occurs when I 
expect it, then involuntarily I laugh. Why? Because I now have 
before me a machine that works automatically.  
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This admonition in laughter is part of the social caution that Bergson finds 
operating at the heart of humour—the need to control those who deviate 
from life’s proper function (to create, to be novel)—those who allow the 
mechanical to encrust itself upon the living (through habit, distraction, 
interference): “This is no longer life, it is automatism established in life and 
imitating it. It belongs to the comic.”49  Yet what is notable here is that the 
perception of repetition, through gesture, results in “involuntarily” laughter 
amongst those condemning it. The automatism is infectious. 
Yet it is not only repetition, but an excess of similarity that leads to 
further humour. Bergson links this notion to a related problem found in 
Blaise Pascal’s Pensées: 
This seems to me the solution of the little riddle propounded by 
Pascal in one passage of his Thoughts: “Two faces that are alike, 
although neither of them excites laughter by itself, make us laugh 
when together, on account of their likeness.” It might just as well be 
said: “The gestures of a public speaker, no one of which is 
laughable by itself, excite laughter by their repetition.” The truth is 
that a really living life should never repeat itself. Wherever there is 
repetition or complete similarity, we always suspect some 
mechanism at work behind the living. Analyse the impression you 
get from two faces that are too much alike, and you will find that 
you are thinking of two copies cast in the same mould, or two 
impressions of the same seal, or two reproductions of the same 
negative—in a word, of some manufacturing process or other. This 
deflection of life towards the mechanical is here the real cause of 
laughter.50 
This excess of similarity creates a comical monstrosity. Hence, perhaps, one 
answer to the negative reception of Gus Van Sant’s replica of Psycho: the 
excess similarity is not only a repetition of crude audio-visual structure and 
story, but a monstrous, mechanical one lacking in the minimal vitality that 
would make a remake more than simply a repeition of form, but the 
regeneration, or reinvention, of an idea. The Five Obstructions document how 
one might repeat the gestures of a short film, but doing so without this 
becoming a mechanical gesture—and this occurs through Leth’s creative 
responses to von Trier’s obstructions. Each remake “reinvents”—to use 
Bergson’s term—the original, and thereby remakes not a story component or 
visual, but what was gestured, suggested, or directed, in the original. In true 
Bergsonian fashion, it is a movement—actual and bodily—rather than an 
ideal (Deleuzian virtual) that is realised. Van Sant takes full control his film 
by molding it on a fixed ideal (Hitchcock’s 1960 original) and yet in doing 
so, only makes his work all the more mechanical—or rather, exposes his 
own art to the accusation of being an automatism, a predictable cliché. Even 
when Leth was given full “control” of the third remake, he did not revert to 
(his) “type” and utilise his normal long-take realist aesthetic—he invented a 
J o h n  Ó  M a o i l e a r c a  |  2 1 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.777 
new style (itself composed of others’ clichés). By reinventing them for 
himself, however, he removed them from being simple formulae, just as his 
remake on The Perfect Human are never predictable.  
Bergson’s philosophy was once described as “an analysis against 
analysis”, and as such it could only suggest rather than demonstrate its truth.51 
Accordingly, it is entirely true, as Bernard Gilson wrote, that each of 
Bergson’s books was “conceived at once as a scientific work and as a work of 
art.”52 Writing in 1965, Paul de Man put the nature of Bergson’s aesthetic in 
an even clearer light: “The poetic image […] becomes a close verbal 
approximation to what perception and sensation are actually like, much 
closer, at any rate, than the purely intellectual representation of reality found 
in the scientific concept.  Poetics thus becomes a vital source for theoretical 
psychology, rather than a minor part of it.”53 The poetic image is not an 
ornament but an aisthesis, which we see now as a matter of “attitude,” of 
“approximation,” and of “direction”: an imagery that embodies (gestures) 
suggestion, at least when it comes to communicating an intuition to another 
mind. Such posturing or “posing” is a much cinematic, however, as it is 
philosophical.  
Despite Bergson’s ambivalent relationship with the cinematic 
apparatus (as a device of capture and projection), we need not turn to 
Deleuze’s monstrous reading to redeem it. That rendering inflates the virtual 
into (unBergsonian) ontology and so pays too high a price (while also 
replacing a critique of capture with a commendation of editing): we can 
instead retain the processual and anti-Platonist dimension of Bergson’s 
thought, and render it cinematic, but only by focusing on the important place 
of the actual body—of gesture, attitude, and suggestion—in Bergsonism. 
Indeed, it is the cinematic Bergson that exposes the postural aspect of 
cinema and shows how one “idea” can be remade again and again and yet 
also be novel—through reinvention. 
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